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INTRODUCTION 
In the law of felony murder, the doctrine of merger 
provides that lesser homicides cannot serve as predicates to 
elevate homicidal crimes to murder.1  The reason is simple.  If 
felonies such as manslaughter or negligent homicide could be 
the basis of a murder conviction, these lesser homicides would 
disappear.  Manslaughter and negligent homicide are felonies 
themselves; they result in death; and therefore, if they 
qualified as predicate felonies, every manslaughter and 
negligent homicide would become, instead, a murder.2  This 
would effectively destroy the system of crime-grading created 
by the legislature. 
Some jurisdictions, in bursts of thoroughness, have 
 
 * A.B. Harvard College; J.D. University of Texas School of Law.  John B. 
Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston. 
 1. See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 2. Id. 
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extended the doctrine of merger to assaultive crimes.3  Some 
have even extended it to burglaries that are based on intent 
to commit assault.4  Other jurisdictions have avoided these 
results by declining to extend the doctrine of merger to 
assaultive crimes or to assaultive burglaries.5  Still others 
apply merger to assaults but retain the felony murder rule in 
cases in which they can identify an “independent felonious 
purpose” in addition to the intent to assault.6 
This Article begins with an example of an assaultive 
homicide.  It then sets out the well-known arguments for and 
against the felony murder doctrine, against which the 
possibility of assaultive felony murder should be evaluated.  
The third section contains a brief introduction to the doctrine 
of merger.  In the fourth section, this Article analyzes the 
reasoning of jurisdictions that apply merger to prevent 
assaults from becoming the basis of felony murder.  The fifth 
section then looks at jurisdictions that avoid merger of 
assaultive crimes, including those that rely on the doctrine of 
independent felonious purpose.  The final section sets out the 
author’s conclusions, which include the proposition that 
application of merger to assaultive crimes is unjustified if the 
felony murder doctrine itself is properly defined in the 
particular jurisdiction.  Briefly put, the argument, “I only 
meant to maim the victim, but I guess I went a little too far 
and killed him,” should not excuse the crime of murder. 
I. AN EXAMPLE TO WORK WITH 
In Commonwealth v. Kilburn,7 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court considered a typical situation involving an 
assaultive homicide.  An unknown gunman shot and killed 
the victim after bursting into the victim’s apartment.  
Another individual was visiting the victim and became the 
only witness to the homicide.  The assailant first brandished 
his firearm and pushed the victim back.  He then saw the 
witness and stopped in confusion.  “After a short interlude 
during which the gunman ordered both men about the 
apartment, the gunman shot the victim in the back of the 
 
 3. See infra Part IV of this Article. 
 4. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part V.A of this article. 
 6. See infra Part V.B of this article. 
 7. 780 N.E.2d 1237 (2003). 
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head.”8  Kilburn, the defendant before the court, was not 
present at the scene, but was later linked to a conspiracy to 
punish or discipline the victim.  In fact, Kilburn confessed to 
this latter crime, but denied that he had anything to do with 
any homicide or murder.  According to Kilburn, the gunman 
“had just gone there to ‘do’ ”  the victim.9  The jury convicted 
Kilburn of murder, under instructions that included the 
felony murder rule. 
Kilburn’s argument, as might be expected, was that the 
inclusion of the felony murder instruction was reversible 
error because the underlying felony was an assault.  
Therefore, he argued, it merged into the homicide, so 
application of the felony murder rule was impermissible.10  
The court’s convoluted analysis is discussed later in this 
Article,11 because understanding the analysis requires the 
understanding of further felony murder doctrines.  The 
situation is set out here as an example. 
A too-quick conclusion about this situation is likely to 
precipitate two kinds of mistakes.  The first mistake is to 
think that the felony murder rule was not even needed in 
Commonwealth v. Kilburn because the facts were clear 
enough to support a murder conviction without it.  That 
reasoning omits the proof standard and the effect that 
Kilburn’s description of his instructions to the gunman, and 
his exculpatory theory, could have had.  All elements of 
Kilburn’s guilt were required to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.12  Some evidence of Kilburn’s mens rea 
would not have been sufficient.  A preponderance would not 
have been sufficient.  Even strong evidence of Kilburn’s 
complicity in the crime would not have been sufficient.  There 
was no further direct evidence of Kilburn’s participation, and 
it probably would have been impossible to get more.13  
Kilburn’s statement about the event readily could have been 
considered as creating a reasonable doubt about his guilt for 
murder, given the confusing nature of vicarious liability 
 
 8. Id. at 1240. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra Part V.B of this Article. 
 12. See generally DAVID CRUMP ET AL, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, 
AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES Ch. 4 (3d ed. 2014). 
 13. Under the circumstances, this kind of evidence would have to have come 
from Kilburn or from his co-felon, who was unknown. 
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instructions.14  From the standpoint of achieving justice in 
such a case, the assistant district attorney trying the case 
was correct to request, and the trial judge to give, a felony 
murder instruction. 
The second mistake would be to consider the felony 
murder rule to be unneeded in this or any situation because 
lesser crimes are always sufficient to achieve justice.  On the 
contrary, a felony crime that results in death is not merely 
the underlying felony crime alone.15  It has been suggested 
that every jurisdiction should create a plethora of crimes such 
as robbery causing death, sexual assault causing death, and 
so forth, instead of a felony murder doctrine.16  That might be 
a solution, but it confuses the issue.  Felony murders look like 
serious crimes, and they are.17  It also might be suggested 
that felony murders can be covered by depraved-heart 
statutes, which cover unintentional murders.18  But many 
jurisdictions have considered and rejected the depraved-heart 
formulation for murder because it is a vague dragnet,19 and it 
is doubtful that it is preferable to a well-constructed felony 
murder rule.20  
 
 14. The instructions would be confusing to the jury.  The reason is that 
felony murder instructions are often long, much longer than those for other 
homicidal crimes, and they often contain additional requirements whose 
meaning and relevance would not be obvious to a lay person. 
 15. For example, in my home jurisdiction, aggravated assault is a second-
degree felony, whereas murder is a first-degree felony.  See Tex. Penal Code §§ 
22.02 (aggravated assault), 19.02 (murder). 
 16. See David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony 
Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L.& PUB. POL’Y 359, 363 (1985). 
 17. Cf. DAVID CRUMP, supra note 12, at 131–32 (reporting on crime in which 
bullet fired only for the purpose of destruction of property ricocheted and killed 
a toddler in her home and bystander said, “Maybe this was an accident, but it 
feels like murder.”).  See also David Crump, supra note 16, at 363–64; see also 
infra note 19 (reporting Bureau of Justice statistics poll in which Americans 
ranked some unintended crimes as more serious than some with intentional 
malice). 
 18. See David Crump, Murder, Pennsylvania Style: Comparing Traditional 
American Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal Code Jurisdictions, 109 
W.VA. L.REV. 257, 305–12 (analyzing depraved heart murder). 
 19. The depraved heart formula is vague because it does not describe the 
mental state of the crime, other than to say that it is the product of a depraved 
(or abandoned and malignant) heart, and thus it relies upon a metaphor instead 
of a definition.  Metaphors are undesirable as a means of defining crime, 
precisely because they are deliberately imprecise. 
 20. See id. 
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II. THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FELONY MURDER 
The morality of the felony murder rule has been debated 
extensively. 
Detractors argue that the doctrine cannot achieve any 
deterrence because felons will not know about it, and that 
unintentional homicides cannot be deterred anyway.21  
Furthermore, abolitionists argue that the doctrine divorces 
guilt from blameworthiness.22 
Supporters of the rule, on the other hand, see felony 
murder as an aspect of proportional crime grading.  This 
argument is based on the ground that a robbery, assault, or 
other felony that causes death is not merely the underlying 
felony, but a more serious crime.23  Supporters also debunk 
the opponents’ deterrence arguments: felons may not be able 
to quote the statute, but they know that they have done 
something more serious if they kill.  Additionally, the 
detractors’ argument proves too much because it would result 
in the abolition of all unintended homicidal crimes as well as 
all negligence doctrine itself.24  Furthermore, the felony 
murder rule reaffirms the sanctity of human life.  Other 
arguments on both sides have been well-developed 
elsewhere.25 
And there is another issue related to these arguments, 
because there are good and bad formulations of the felony 
murder rule.  Bad formulations, such as the confusing law of 
California, operate independently of the dangerousness of the 
defendant’s actions.  A dangerous felony is enough, even if the 
death of a victim is an unforeseeable accident.26  But there 
are better formulations, such as the Texas felony murder 
statute, which requires the defendant to have engaged in an 
“act clearly dangerous to human life.”27  This better 
 
 21. See David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of 
Modern Criticisms: Doesn’t the Conclusion Depend on the Particular Rule at 
Issue?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1155, 1158–61 (2009). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. at 1161–65. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 1158–65; see also David Crump et al., supra note 16, at 361-76 
(stating justifications of the rule at greater length). 
 26. See David Crump, supra note 21, at 1170–75 (critiquing the California 
felony murder doctrine as arbitrary and less connected to blameworthiness than 
better formulations). 
 27. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (statute containing this definition 
as covering one of three types of murder). 
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formulation avoids divorcing the defendant’s guilt from the 
defendant’s blameworthiness, because the defendant must 
have engaged in a clearly dangerous act.28  And thus, the 
better formulation answers the most important argument of 
the critics of the felony murder rule. 
These preliminaries, however, are addressed in other 
articles, and they will not be further discussed here.  
However, they provide context for the purpose of this Article, 
which is to consider the propriety of basing felony murder on 
felony assault.  The Article will assume that the jurisdiction 
in question has a felony murder rule, as most jurisdictions do, 
and it will assume that the rule is, or can be, formulated as 
the better felony murder doctrines are.  In these 
circumstances, how should the jurisdiction treat homicides 
that include a felony assault?  In other words, how should 
they handle felony murder arguments like those in 
Commonwealth v. Kilburn, described above? 
III. THE MERGER DOCTRINE 
The rationale for the merger doctrine is straightforward.  
It prevents the conversion of lesser homicidal crimes into 
murder and preserves the grading of homicidal offenses.  
Without it, felonies that result in death, such as 
manslaughter or negligent homicide, would automatically 
become murder, contrary to the legislative intent underlying 
these lesser crimes.29 
Sometimes, as in California, the doctrine is a common 
law inference from the legislature’s grading of homicidal 
offenses.30  The inference makes sense because otherwise the 
lesser homicides would be made meaningless.  In some cases, 
the doctrine is expressed in the statute that creates the 
state’s felony murder rule.  For example, Missouri recognizes 
murder when the defendant’s actions satisfy the specified 
dangerousness criteria and also include a causative felony, 
which must be “other than . . . manslaughter.”31 
The merger doctrine is well established.  Without it, one 
court long ago explained, the felony murder rule would 
 
 28. See David Crump, supra note 21, at 1165–70 (analyzing this better 
formulation). 
 29. See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 30. See People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580 (1969). 
 31. See State v. Gheen, 41 S.W.3d 598, 604–05 (Mo. App. 2001) (citing 
statute). 
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“convert many cases of unintentional killing, which would be 
manslaughter only under other provisions of the statute, into 
murder.”32  Likewise, according to another court, “to hold 
otherwise would eliminate [lesser killings] as a separate form 
of homicide, since, in that event, every [lesser killing] would 
also be a felony murder.”33 
In one state, it was at first unclear even that the crime of 
negligent homicide was not a predicate for felony murder.  
The controlling legislation, outlined above, disqualified only 
manslaughter as a predicate for felony murder.34  This 
anomaly arose from legislative oversight.  When the 
legislature first passed the felony murder statute, criminally 
negligent homicide was a misdemeanor.35  It therefore could 
not have served as the basis for felony murder.  Later, the 
legislature redefined criminally negligent homicide as a 
felony and increased the maximum sentence,36 but it failed to 
amend the felony murder statute accordingly. 
The court thus faced a situation in which the rationale 
for doctrine of merger applied, but the words of the statute 
literally excluded the doctrine.  In Lawson v. State,37 the court 
reasoned, in accordance with the longstanding purpose of the 
merger doctrine, that “felony murder . . . will not lie when 
with the underlying felony is manslaughter [which was 
eliminated by the controlling statute] or a lesser included 
offense of manslaughter.”  This holding carried out the 
function of the merger doctrine: to avoid the destruction of 
the legislatively crafted hierarchy of homicidal crimes. 
IV. MERGER OF ASSAULTIVE CRIMES 
Some jurisdictions have extended the merger doctrine 
beyond lesser homicidal crimes and have applied it to 
assaultive offenses.38  By its terms, the felony murder rule 
 
 32. State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 562–63 (1878). 
 33. Edge v. State, 414 S.E.2d 463, 465 (Ga. 1992). 
 34. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3) (basing felony murder on a felony 
“other than manslaughter.”). 
 35. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.07 (West 1974), construed in State v. 
Hall, 829 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (describing criminally 
negligent homicide statute as originally enacted as “a class A misdemeanor.”). 
 36. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (West 2014) (substituting “state jail 
felony” for “Class A misdemeanor,” as penalty). 
 37. 64 S.W.3d 396, 397 (Tex. Crim. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. State, 4 
S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim. 1999)). 
 38. See infra Part V of this article. 
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can be based on assault only if it is a felonious assault.  So-
called simple assault cannot qualify, usually, because it is a 
misdemeanor.  In fact, to be a felony an assault must be 
particularly serious.  In jurisdictions following the Model 
Penal Code, for example, felony assault, which is called 
“aggravated” assault, requires the loss of, or protracted loss of 
use of, a bodily member or organ.39  It is roughly analogous to 
what the common law called “mayhem.”40  However, beating 
up an individual, even by causing bruises all over, is merely 
simple assault. 
One state disallowing assaultive felony murder is 
California.  In People v. Ireland,41 the California Supreme 
Court treated assaultive homicide as analogous to other forms 
of murder.  The crime of assault, it reasoned, was an “integral 
part of the homicide,”42 just as manslaughter and negligent 
homicide would be.  Therefore, treating assault that caused 
death as murder was “bootstrapping” that “finds no support 
in either logic or in law.”43  Further, intentional assaults that 
caused death would become murder and assaultive homicide 
was “a category that included the great majority of all 
homicides.”44 
The court carried this analysis further when, in People v. 
Wilson,45 it decided a case that involved burglary with intent 
to commit assault, which caused the death of the victim.  The 
assaultive burglary, said the court, could not provide a basis 
for felony murder.  The assaultive element that was essential 
to the burglary predicate was a lesser included crime of 
murder, even if the burglary “technically” was not.46  The 
higher crime overlapped the assault.  To elevate the offense to 
murder would be “bootstrapping.”47  For these reasons, 
the crime of murder was merged into the assaultive element 
in the burglary, and therefore into the burglary itself.48  
 
 39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (1962). 
 40. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 41. 450 P.2d 580 (1969). 
 42. Id. at 590. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969) (en banc), overruled by People v. Farley, 210 
P.3d 361 (Cal. 2009). 
 46. Id. at 29. 
 47. Id. at 28–29. 
 48. Id.  The merger doctrine was specifically mentioned later in People v. 
Sears, 465 P.2d 847, 850 (Cal. 1970), superseded on other grounds by statute, 
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Other jurisdictions have rejected this reasoning, holding that 
assaultive burglary is a proper predicate for felony murder49 
because burglary increases the intrusion and dangerousness 
of an assaultive encounter.50 
The California Supreme Court’s reasoning about 
assaultive felony murder reasoning is superficial.  In the first 
place, assault is not analogous to homicidal crimes with 
respect to the merger doctrine.  Homicidal crimes are 
different, because manslaughter and negligent homicide 
would cease to exist if they were proper predicates for felony 
murder.  Because they result in death, these felony crimes 
would always be elevated to murder.51  Assault, on the other 
hand, would not constitute murder if the crime did not result 
in death.  The crime would not differ from other crimes that 
are proper predicates for felony murder, such as robbery or 
rape.  The merger doctrine simply applies differently to 
homicidal and non-homicidal crimes. 
More importantly, from a prudential (or policy) 
standpoint, the defensive theory of a person accused of 
assaultive homicide is outlandish, and the defensive 
reasoning itself shows why the crime should be murder if a 
felony assault results in death.  In jurisdictions that follow 
the Model Penal Code, the felony version of assault is called 
aggravated assault.52  This crime requires use of a deadly 
weapon such as a firearm to accomplish the assault or, 
alternatively, causing serious bodily injury.  Serious bodily 
injury is defined so that only an extremely serious injury will 
suffice; the assault must cause the loss (or protracted loss of 
the use of) a bodily member or organ.53  The victim must lose 
a hand, or an arm, or a leg, or the like.  This is the kind of 
crime that qualifies as felony assault and that would be 
necessary for assaultive homicide. 
Given this background, the defensive theory carries a 
heavy dose of irony.  The defendant must be saying, “I 
intended only to beat him so badly that I would maim him, or 
 
CALJIC No. 2.90. 
 49. E.g., People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 1993). 
 50. See id. at 87–88. 
 51. This is the rationale underlying the merger principle.  See supra notes 
29–30 and accompanying text. 
 52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (1962). 
 53. Or serious permanent disfigurement.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) 
(1969). 
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in other words, I intended only mayhem.54  Gee, I guess I 
must have gone too far, and now he’s dead.  But I didn’t 
commit a murder.”  Or, if the deadly weapon provision is the 
basis of the felony, the argument becomes, “I intended only to 
fire a warning shot at him, but my warning shot must have 
been really accurate, because it went right into the victim’s 
head.”  These sorts of excuses, aside from usually being 
perjurious, are not of the kind that should avoid the felony 
murder rule. 
In fact, the common law recognized assaultive homicide 
intended to cause serious bodily injury as supplying the 
malice aforethought required for murder.55  California’s 
murder statute, derived from the common law definition, 
defines murder as the causing of death with malice 
aforethought.56  Had the Wilson court faithfully applied the 
common law definition of malice aforethought in interpreting 
the statute, it would have concluded that felony assaultive 
homicide is murder. 
Finally, some jurisdictions have not applied the merger 
doctrine to assaultive homicides.  These jurisdictions’ 
decisions could have been considered as persuasive authority.  
This Article will now turn to these decisions, and to the 
related notion of independent felonious purpose. 
V. ASSAULTIVE HOMICIDE AS FELONY MURDER  
A. Felony Murder by the Definition of the Crime   
Jurisdictions that consider assaultive homicides to be 
felony murder generally use more straightforward reasoning.  
For example, in State v. Gheen,57 the court followed the 
legislative definition of the crime, which provided that felony 
murder could be predicated on felonies “other than murder or 
manslaughter.”  Assault, of course, is not manslaughter, and 
thus the statutory definition made the crime murder.  The 
legislature was capable of reasoning that a crime in which the 
defendant’s argument is, “I intended only to beat him within 
 
 54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 55. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., supra note 12, at 74–75 (defining other types 
of malice). 
 56. Cf. People v. Mejia, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 843, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) 
(deriving meaning of malice aforethought from common law).  As for common 
law, see CRUMP, supra note 12, at 74–75. 
 57. 41 S.W.3d 598, 604–05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
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an inch of his life, but I went an inch too far,” is as much a 
murder as other kinds of murder. 
Other jurisdictions have distinguished the merger 
reasoning in deciding that assaultive homicide is felony 
murder.  In Baker v. State,58 the defendant claimed to have 
aimed his firearm over the victim’s head, but instead he shot 
the victim to death.  As in Wilson, the court considered the 
argument that assault is an integral part of a resulting 
homicide and therefore should not be a basis of felony 
murder.59  But the legislative definition of assault, unlike 
homicidal crimes, would not be disturbed as manslaughter or 
negligent homicide would be, if assault were made the basis 
of felony murder.60  The merger doctrine therefore would not 
apply.  
Decisions following Gheen and Baker show that, contrary 
to the concerns of the California court, assaultive felony 
murder does not dispense with requirements of malice or 
destroy manslaughter as a separate crime.  The jury must 
simply find whether, within the underlying assault, the kind 
of passion that qualifies for manslaughter was present to 
negate malice.61  Likewise, a finding of merely reckless 
assault could presumably reduce the crime to involuntary 
manslaughter. 
B. Felony Murder by the Doctrine of Independent 
Felonious Purpose  
Some jurisdictions have avoided the merger of assaultive 
homicide, and considered it in limited circumstances to be a 
basis of felony murder, when they have found the crime to 
have arisen from an “independent felonious purpose.”62  For 
example, one can imagine a burglar who intends to enter a 
building for the purpose of theft.  Before he can enter the 
building to complete the burglary, he is confronted by a 
security guard.  In an effort to escape, the would-be burglar 
assaults the security guard and causes his death, 
 
 58. 225 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1976). 
 59. Id. at 271. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Malone v. State, 232 S.E.2d 907, 908 (Ga. 1977); Edge v. State, 414 
S.E.2d 463, 465 (Ga. 1992). 
 62. See, e.g., People v. Davison, 923 N.E.2d 781, 787 (Ill. 2010) (holding that 
felony of “mob action,” by which defendant and co-felons pursued victim and 
stabbed and hit him, had an “independent felonious purpose.”). 
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independently of the intended burglary.  In this situation, 
many jurisdictions would consider the assault and the 
burglary to be independent and therefore uphold the 
characterization of the assaultive homicide as murder.63 
At times, the independent felonious purpose doctrine has 
been stretched to lengths that make the reasoning seem less 
than credible.  For example, in the previously discussed case 
of Commonwealth v. Kilburn,64 the planner behind the crime 
sent a henchman to assault the victim.  The on-scene actor 
then assaulted the victim at the door to the victim’s location 
before proceeding inward to shoot the victim to death.65  In 
this unappealing situation, the planner’s story was that he 
wanted his hit man only to discipline the victim, not to kill 
him.  The planner had sent the gunman only to “do” the 
victim.66  The Massachusetts trial judge had instructed the 
jury on the felony murder rule, with assault as the predicate 
felony.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court generally 
disapproved of felony assaultive murder, but it reasoned that 
there were two assaults in this case.67  The court considered 
the initial assault of the defendant at the door to be separate 
from the homicidal assault.  On this basis, the court 
pronounced that because of the “independent” felony 
exhibited in the assault at the door, the merger doctrine did 
not apply.68  The court therefore refused to vacate the 
defendant’s murder conviction. 
As Kilburn demonstrates, the independent felonious 
purpose doctrine invites manipulation.  The result seems 
justifiable, because affordance of the defendant’s murder 
conviction would appear sensible to many observers, but the 
underlying reasoning is troubling.  Calling the first assault 
“independent” sounds like judicial fudging, given that the 
objective of assaulting the homicide victim the second time 
and killing him was the defendant’s ostensible purpose 
throughout.  The crime was a unified series of events with a 
singular purpose, so it would be illogical to consider the 
assaults independently. 
But given that the Massachusetts court had to respect an 
 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46, 57. 
 64. 780 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. 2003). 
 65. Id. at 1240. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1240–41. 
 68. Id. 
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existing jurisprudence that merged the murder into the 
assault and usually prevented judgments of assaultive felony 
murder, and given the existence of the independent felonious 
purpose doctrine, the court may have done the best it could 
with a crime that it firmly believed deserved the label of 
murder.  A more straightforward pathway to this outcome 
would be to consider assaultive felony murder as a crime.  In 
fact, the application of the independent felonious purpose 
doctrine has amounted to judicial sleight of hand in other 
cases resulting in murder convictions as well.69 
CONCLUSION 
The felony murder rule should apply to assaults under 
the requisite conditions for felony murder, just as it would in 
cases involving rape or robbery.  Felony assault is a serious, 
violent assault, as the Model Penal Code 
exemplifies, requiring either use of a deadly weapon or the 
loss of a bodily member or organ.  The defendant’s argument 
is singularly unappealing when he says, “I intended only to 
beat him within an inch of his life and maim him, but I guess 
I went too far,” or, “I intended only to fire a warning shot, but 
by mistake, I shot him between the eyes.”  There is no good 
policy reason for avoiding the characterization of this 
circumstance as murder.  In jurisdictions that recognize 
depraved-heart murder, less egregious combinations of mens 
rea and conduct are understandably called murder.  
Furthermore, the rationale of the merger doctrine is 
inapplicable in these circumstances.  The purpose of 
preventing crimes such as manslaughter and negligent 
homicide from supporting felony murder is that those crimes 
would disappear if they could be used in this manner.  A 
manslaughter or negligent homicide results in death, by 
definition, and these two felonies would therefore always 
qualify as felony murder, inconsistently with the legislative 
intent to define these crimes as lesser than murder.  This 
result would not follow in the usual case of felony assault, 
because that crime does not involve death. 
The doctrine of independent felonious purpose provides a 
 
 69. Cf. People v. Davison, 923 N.W.2d 781 (Ill. 2010) (finding independent 
felony of “mob action” where defendant and others assaulted the victim and 
killed him).  The “mob action” felony, there, amounted to a group assault and 
was hardly “independent.” 
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way for a court to escape the merger bar and characterize an 
assaultive homicide as murder.  But independent felonious 
purpose invites manipulation, as the jurisprudence of 
Massachusetts indicates.  Furthermore, it does not separate 
serious assaultive homicides that deserve to be called murder 
from less serious crimes that do not.  The best approach, for 
straightforward application by courts and consistent results, 
would be for courts to do what some have done: to enable 
homicidal felony assault, in proper cases, to be defined as 
murder. 
